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A Retreat in Double Jeopardy Policy: Tibbs v. Florida' — The First United
States Congress incorporated into the Bill of Rights 2
 a prohibition against dou-
ble jeopardy, stating in the fifth amendment to the Constitution that no person
shall " . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."' Despite this straightforward language, determining whether the dou-
ble jeopardy clause's protection applies in a given criminal proceeding is not
always easy.* Although the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant against
repeated prosecutions for the same offense, 5 the right is not absolute. 6 The
government has a valid interest in punishing those guilty of criminal offenses,
thereby vindicating the state's vital interest in the enforcement of criminal
laws.' As a result of these competing interests, a court's determination of
whether the double jeopardy bar prohibits further prosecution in any given
case is based, either explicitly or implicitly, on a judicial balancing of the de-
102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982).
2 For a detailed description of how the double jeopardy clause came to be incor-
porated, see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-43 (1975). See also Comment, Double
Jeopardy and Government Appeals, 52 TEX. L. REV. 303, 307-09 (1974); 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 729-32 (1971); S. Jour., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 71, 77
(1820 ed.).
U.S. CONST. amend V. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was held
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 794 (1969), which overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
The concept of double jeopardy is deeply rooted in western civilization. Bartkus v. Il-
linois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). The principle that no man should be
punished twice for the same offense was not entirely unknown to the Greeks and Romans, and
early English common law was opposed to putting a man in jeopardy twice. J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969). See also Kirk, 'Jeopardy" During the Period of the Yearbooks, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 602, 602 (1934); Note, Twice In jeopardy, 75 YALE L. J. 262, 262 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Twice in jeopardy'. The concept is clearly expressed in Blackstone's dicta that it was a
"universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of
his life more than once for the same offense." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335-36
(1789).
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978) (" [This deceptively plain language has given
rise to problems both subtle and complex . . . "); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978)
("These historical [double jeopardy] purposes are necessarily general in nature, and their ap-
plication has come to abound in often subtle distinctions which cannot by any means all be traced
to the original three common law pleas. . . ."); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)
("The Court's holdings in this area . can hardly be characterized as models of consistency and
clarity.").
The difficulty of applying the double jeopardy clause has also been recognized by com-
mentators. See, e.g., Fisher, Double Jeopardy: Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
81 (1967) (describing the concept of double jeopardy as a "wilderness of legal complexity");
Batchelder, Former jeopardy, 17 AM. L. REV. 735, 748-49 (1883) (stating "Nobody disputes the
justice or the obligation of the rule of former jeopardy in the abstract, the difficulty is in deciding
where it shall be applied"); Mead, Double Jeopardy Protection—Illusion or Reality?, 13 IND. L. REV.
863 (1980) (observing that "The simple language of the double jeopardy clause belies the difficul-
ty courts have had in applying and scholars have had in discussing its protection").
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976).
6 See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) ("But justice, though due the accused, is due to the accuser also.").
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fendant's interests against those of the government.° This balancing is done by
inquiring whether the additional proceeding would be an "act of governmental
oppression of the sort against which the double jeopardy clause was intended to
protect.'" When a court determines that the requisite oppression exists, the
government's interest in the enforcement of the criminal law is subordinated to
the interests of the defendant and retrial is forbidden.
In 1974, Delbert Tibbs was charged in a three count indictment with the
rape of a woman named Cynthia Nadeau, the premeditated murder of a man
named Terry Milroy, and the crime of felony, murder for killing Milroy while
raping Nadeau.'° Nadeau, the State's chief trial witness, testified that she and
Milroy were hitchhiking when they were picked up by a man driving a green
truck." The man drove a short distance, then turned off the highway into a
field and stopped the truck." He then requested that Milroy get out to help
him siphon gas from some farm machinery." After a few minutes passed,
Nadeau got out of the truck and went around to the back where she discovered
the driver pointing a gun at Milroy." The driver informed Milroy that he
wanted to have sex with Nadeau and commanded her to undress." After forc-
ing Nadeau to engage in sodomy, the driver shot and wounded Milroy."
Milroy pleaded for his life, but the man fired again, inflicting the fatal
wound." The killer then proceeded to rape Nadeau, following which he
ordered her to dress and return to the truck.' 8 After returning to the highway
The Supreme Court has recognized the need to balance these competing interests.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-05 (1978); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 479 (1971).
Commentators have also discussed the need to weigh the defendant's interests against
those of the state. See, e.g., Comment, The 1978 Double Jeopardy Cases—Mistrials, Dismissals, and
Acquittals, 83 DICK. L. REV. 291, 293-94 (1978) ("[I]n essence, all double jeopardy problems en-
tail a weighing of the defendant's double jeopardy interests, as they are implicated, against the
public's interest.") and Recent Development, Emerging Standards in Supreme Court Double Jeopardy
Analysis, 32 VAND. L. REV. 609, 614 (1979) ("The Court balances these competing policies in
every double jeopardy case, regardless of the particular problem presented.").
9
 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). The clearest expression of the policy
behind the double jeopardy protection is found in Green v. United States, in which the Court stated;
"[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continu-
ing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty."
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
10 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2213 (1982).
11
 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1976). Nadeau later gave a detailed descrip-
tion of the vehicle, testifying that it had a rounded hood, black vinyl seats, no door handle, and
an oil light that blinked on and off. Id.
12 Id.
" Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2213 (1982).
14 Id.
as Id.
' 6 Id.
" Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1976).
" Id.
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and driving a short distance, he stopped the truck and ordered Nadeau to walk
in front of it." She left the truck, but ran in the opposite direction and was able
to escape successfully."
A jury found Tibbs guilty of first degree murder and rape and recom-
mended the death sentence. 2 ' The trial judge subsequently imposed the death
sentence. 22 Tibbs appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Florida."
Tibbs contended that the totality of evidence offered by the State at trial was in-
sufficient to place him at the scene of the murder and rape, or to establish
beyond all reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator. 24 A plurality of three
' justices reversed Tibbs' conviction. 25 Identifying several weaknesses in the
State's case, 26
 the justices stated that they had considerable doubt that Tibbs
was guilty. 27
 Under Florida law no corroborative evidence was required in a
rape case if the victim was able to testify directly to the crime and identify the
defendant as her assailant." The court said, however, that the limitation on
this rule was that the testimony of the victim had to be "carefully scrutinized so
as to avoid an unmerited conviction." 29 The court reversed the conviction and
19 Id.
26 Id. Nadeau subsequently ran to a nearby house and called the police. She gave the
police a detailed description of the driver and his vehicle. A few days later, Tibbs was stopped by
a patrolman in a different part of the state because he appeared to match Nadeau's description of
her assailant. After examining photographs taken of Tibbs, Nadeau identified him as the driver
of the vehicle. She later picked Tibbs out of a policeman's line-up and during trial positively
identified him as her assailant. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2213-14 (1982).
21
 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1976).
22 Id,
93 Id. At the time of Tibbs' first appeal, under Florida Appellate Rule 6.16(b) (1962),
the court was obligated to review any conviction for which the death penalty had been imposed to
determine if the "interests of justice" required a new trial. The substance of this rule has been
recodified in Rule 9.140(f) of the Florida Rules Appellate Procedure (1977). Id.
24 Id. Tibbs stated that there was no evidence to support or corroborate Nadeau's
testimony and that her statements at trial were so conflicting and inherently unreliable that his
conviction should be reversed. Id. at 789-90.
n Id. at 790.
26 Id. The court identified several infirmities in the State's case:
1) Except for the testimony of the victim, no evidence was introduced to place Tibbs
at or near the scene of the crime.
2) Despite the victim's detailed description of the truck, the vehicle was never found.
3) No gun or car keys were ever found in Tibbs' possession.
4) Tibbs cooperated fully with the police when he was stopped.
5) The State introduced no evidence casting doubt on Tibbs' veracity.
6) Several features of the victim's testimony cast doubt on her believability. First,
while she claimed that the crimes occurred while it was still light out, all other
evidence indicated that the crimes occurred after nightfall. Second, Nadeau ad-
mitted using marijuana throughout the day. Third,' the fact that Nadeau first
identified Tibbs in a suggestive photograph session indicated a less reliable iden-
tification than would have been possible had she picked him out of a book with
multiple photographs of more than one person. Id. at 790-91.
27 Id. at 791.
28 See Thomas v. State, 167 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1964).
29 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ha. 1976) (quoting Thomas v. State, 167 So. 2d
at 310).
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remanded the case for a new tria1. 3° The court reasoned that it did not want to
risk "the very real possibility" that Tibbs had nothing to do with the crimes."
On remand, Tibbs moved for a dismissal arguing that retrial would
violate the double jeopardy clause." In deciding whether to grant the motion,
the trial court was forced to consider the principles articulated in Burks v. Unleed
States," a case decided subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court's reversal of
Tibbs' conviction." In Burks, the United States Supreme Court held that
where an appellate court reverses a conviction based on the insufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial, the double jeopardy clause barred further prosecu-
tion. 35
 Based on Burks, the trial court granted Tibbs' motion to dismiss, con-
cluding that to retry Tibbs would in fact violate the double jeopardy clause. 36
The State appealed Tibbs' dismissal to an intermediate appellate court."
The appellate court reversed the trial court and held that Tibbs could be
retried." The court distinguished Burks by characterizing the state supreme
court's reversal of Tibbs' conviction as one based on the weight of the
evidence, rather than the legal insufficiency of the evidence as in Burks. 39 The
appellate court concluded therefore that Burks did not mandate a dismissal of
Tibbs' case. 4° The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's deci-
sion.*' The court characterized its original reversal of Tibbs' conviction as one
resting on the weight of the evidence. 42 Adopting the reasoning of the appellate
court, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished a reversal based on the weight
of the evidence" from one based on insufficiency and concluded that retrial of
Tibbs was not barred by the double jeopardy clause." Tibbs then filed a peti-
tion for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court." The Court granted
the petition. 46 In a five-to-four decision," the Court held that retrial of a
3° Id. at 791.
31 Id.
31 State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
" 437 , U.S. 1 (1978).
34 State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
33 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978). The rule of Burks was applied to the
states in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978).
36 State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
" Id.
38 Id. at 388.
39 Id.
4° Id.
4 ' Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1127 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
42 Id. at 1126.
4' Id. at 1123. The court stated that a reversal based on the "weight of the evidence" is
a determination that the greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or
cause than the other. Id.
4' Id. The court said a finding that the evidence is "legally insufficient" means that the
prosecutor had failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
45 Tibbs v. Florida, 454 U.S. 963 (1981).
4' Id.
4 ' Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2221 (1982). Justice O'Connor delivered the opin-
ion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens
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criminal defendant is not barred by the double jeopardy clause when an appel-
late court reverses a conviction based on the weight of the evidence."
The significance of Tibbs v. Florida is that the decision has limited a crim-
inal defendant's protection from being placed twice in jeopardy. First, by per-
mitting retrial following a reversal of a conviction based on the weight of evi-
dence, the Supreme Court has limited the effect of its holding in Burks. As a
result of the Court's holding in Tibbs, some appellate reversals" dealing with
the factual deficiency of the evidence will not bar retrial while other such re-
versals will. Second, and more importantly as far as future double jeopardy
decisions are concerned, the Supreme Court in Tibbs lost sight of the policies
underlying the double jeopardy protection. The Court recognized a double
jeopardy distinction between convictions reversed for insufficient evidence and
those overturned based on the weight of the evidence even though the rationale
preventing retrial in Burks applies with equal weight in Tibbs' situation. In
both instances, the government has failed to present the evidence required to
support a final judgment against the defendant, and retrial presents the grave
danger of unjust conviction that the double jeopardy clause was intended to
prevent. Although reviewing courts in Florida are no longer allowed to reverse
convictions based on the weight of the evidence, courts in other jurisdictions
sometimes rely on the weight of the evidence to do so." It is important for
courts in such other states to recognize the weaknesses of the Tibbs opinion
when interpreting the double jeopardy provisions of their own constitutions."
State law protection against double jeopardy should extend to prohibit further
prosecution of defendants following a reversal based on weight of evidence
even if the federal constitution does not."
This casenote will begin by discussing the background and development of
double jeopardy law to establish the context in which Tibbs a. Florida was de-
cided. Next, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Tibbs will be de-
scribed. The Supreme Court's reasoning will then be analyzed by discussing
joined. Justice White wrote in dissent, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun,
joined. Id.
44 Id. at 2218-19.
49 Although much of the discussion in this casenote refers to "appellate" reversals
based on the weight of the evidence, the same considerations that are presented would logically
also apply to a trial court's finding that a conviction was against the weight of the evidence. See Id.
at 2220 n.22.
'° See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
51
 All but five states (Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and
Vermont) have double jeopardy provisions in their constitutions. The five states that do not have
such a provision in their constitutions consider protection from double jeopardy a part of their
common law. Note, Twice In Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 263 n.3.
" See generally Note, Stepping Into The Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights On State Rather Than
Federal Law, 17 AM. CRIM, L. REV. 339, 340 (1978) ("[A] significant number of state courts have
exceeded the federal minimum by independently interpreting their own state constitutional pro-
visions, which may or may not correspond to their federal counterparts. "); Findlater, Retrial After
A Hung Jury: The Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 701, 736 n.164 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Findlater].
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three major weaknesses in the Tibbs decision. First, the validity of distin-
guishing between the weight of the evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence
in determining whether to invoke the'clouble jeopardy clause will be explored.
This presentation shows the difficulty appellate courts will encounter in at-
tempting to distinguish between reversals based on either of these grounds. It
will be submitted that many appellate reversals can be characterized as based
either upon the weight or the insufficiency of the evidence. It follows that some
courts may take the opportunity provided by the decision in Tibbs to charac-
terize reversals as being upon the weight, rather than the sufficiency of the
evidence, thus allowing for the retrial, rather than the release, of the defend-
ant. Second, recent Supreme Court double jeopardy decisions stressing the dif-
ference between factual and legal determinations made by courts will be ex-
amined. This examination will determine the implication the reasoning of
these earlier opinions has for distinguishing between the weight and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. This section shows that these decisions prohibited retrial
where the earlier proceeding suggests the factual innocence of the defendant.
The Supreme Court allowed retrial in Tibbs, however, despite the fact that re-
versals based on the weight of the evidence are grounded on a court's belief
that the evidence presented at trial did not support a conviction. It will be sub-
mitted that the Supreme Court's failure in Tibbs to follow the reasoning of its
earlier decisions is in error. Third, the policies that underlie the double jeop-
ardy clause will be analyzed to determine their implications for distinguishing
between the weight and sufficiency of evidence in the context of double jeopar-
dy protections. The discussion will focus on the policy considerations
enumerated in Burks and other Supreme Court double jeopardy decisions that
bar retrial following an acquittal or an appellate reversal based on the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. The analysis will demonstrate that because the policy
considerations behind the double jeopardy protection apply with equal force to
reversals based on either the weight or insufficiency of the evidence, the double
jeopardy clause should bar further prosecution in both situations. It will be
submitted that because allowing retrial following a reversal based on the weight
of the evidence affords the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence
it failed to produce in the first trial and places an unfair burden on defendants,
the double jeopardy clause should prohibit further prosecution when a review-
ing court reverses a conviction in this manner.
I. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY LAW
The double jeopardy clause protects a defendant in a criminal proceeding
from multiple punishment or repeated prosecutions for the same offense. 53
This prohibition against being twice put in jeopardy, however, has never been
held absolute. In 1863 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Ball," set forth the
55
 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976).
54
 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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general rule that although the double jeopardy clause prohibited further prose-
cution of a defendant following an acquittal, a defendant who successfully ap-
peals a conviction may be retried for the same offense." Ball concerned two de-
fendants who were convicted of murder. 56 The defendants obtained a reversal
because of a defect in the indictment, namely, that it failed to aver the time or
the place of the death of the victim." After the defendants were retried and
convicted on a proper indictment, they appealed to the. Supreme Court." The
defendants argued that their second trial should have been barred because they
had been tried once for the same offense. 59 The Ball Court rejected this view of
the double jeopardy clause and allowed retrial. 60 The Court held that the gov-
ernment is not prohibited from retrying a defendant following an erroneous
conviction." After Ball, therefore, the double jeopardy clause placed no limita-
tion on the power of a state to retry a defendant who obtained a reversal of his
conviction.
Over a century later, in Burks v. United States, the Supreme Court created
an exception to Ball. 62 The Court held that the double jeopardy clause pre-
cludes retrial of a defendant if the reviewing court finds the evidence presented
at trial insufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict." The defendant in Burks
was tried and convicted of bank robbery. 64 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed Burks' conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the verdict." The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of whether a judgment of acquittal or a new trial
should be granted. 66 The defendant appealed the remand to the United States
Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. 67 The Supreme Court held that the dou-
ble jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment precludes retrial when a de-
fendant's conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence." The Court said that
the appellate reversal was the equivalent of a post-trial verdict of acquittal. 69 If
" Id. at 671.
56 Id. at 664. A third defendant was acquitted at the first proceeding, and the Ball Court
held that he could not be retried. Id. at 669.
" Id.
58 Id. at 666.
59 See ed. at 665.
6° See id. at 671. ("Lilt is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment against
him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon
another indictment, for the same offence of which he had been convicted." Id. at 671-72).
6 Id. at 671-72.
62 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
63 Id. at 18. Although Burks involved a federal prosecution, the Supreme Court in
Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 17 (1978), held that the double jeopardy principle articulated in
Burks applied fully to the states. Id. at 24. Set generally Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
(double jeopardy clause applies to the states).
64 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 2-3.
65 United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1977).
66 Id.
67 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 2 (1978).
68 Id. at 17-18.
69 Id. at 11.
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the verdict of acquittal had been rendered by the trial court, the Court con-
tinued, the double jeopardy clause would have barred retrial." The Court
reasoned that it should make no difference that the reviewing court, rather than
the trial court, determined that the evidence was insufficient." The Burks
Court explained that barring retrial where the state had produced evidence in-
sufficient to convict the defendant at the first trial was central to the double
jeopardy protection." Repeated prosecutions would permit the state to present
additional evidence in an effort to convict the defendant."
Conceding that its earlier double jeopardy decisions were confusing," the
Court in Burks noted that part of this confusion resulted from its prior failure to
distinguish properly between reversals due to trial error and those due to lack
of evidence." The Court suggested that these two types of reversals deserved
different double jeopardy analysis." Reexamining its decision in Ball, the
Court stated that Ball was correct in allowing a new trial to rectify trial error in
the initial proceeding." The Burks Court reasoned that a reversal for trial error
does not constitute a decision that the Government had failed to prove its
case. 78
 Instead, a reversal for trial error is merely a court's determination that
the defendant was convicted through a judicial process that was somehow
defective." The Court explained that following a reversal for trial error, the ac-
cused has a strong interest in obtaining an error-free trial." Moreover, where a
conviction is reversed for trial error, society maintains a valid concern in seeing
that the guilty are punished. 81
 In contrast, the Court said that when a convic-
tion is reversed because the state has failed to present sufficient evidence, the
state has been given one full opportunity to assemble its evidence and society's
interest in the enforcement of criminal laws has therefore been vindicated. 82
'° Id. at 10-11. Previous Supreme Court decisions had held that once a judgment of ac-
quittal is entered, retrial is forbidden. E.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143
(1962); Kepiter v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126-28 (1904).
" Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 11.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 9. The Court's decision in Burks overruled, at least in part, Forman v. United
States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Sapir v. United States,
348 U.S. 373 (1955); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
75
 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 14-15.
76
 Id. at 15.
77 Id. at 14. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), where the Court stated:
"It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from
punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings
leading to the conviction." Id. at 466.
" Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 15.
19 Id. The Court cited incorrect treatment of evidence, incorrect instructions and pros-
ecutorial misconduct as examples of fundamental defects. Id.
°° Id.
a' Id.
as Id. at 16. The Court said that a reversal based on insufficiency of the evidence means
the prosecution's case was so lacking that it should not even have been submitted to the jury. Id.
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The Court cautioned, however, that appellate court reversals should be con-
fined to cases where the prosecutor's failure to prove his case is clear."
In United States o. Scott," the Supreme Court characterized the question of
the applicability of the double jeopardy clause as a matter of distinguishing be-
tween trials which end pursuant to a legal claim and those in which the court
makes a factual determination concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence. 95
In the context of dismissals, this, in effect, amounts to the same distinction as
that between reversal for trial error rather than for the insufficiency of the
evidence. The defendant in Scott was tried in a federal district court for
distribution of narcotics." Both before and during trial, the defendant moved
to dismiss two counts of the indictment against him on the ground that his
defense had been prejudiced by pre-indictment delay." After hearing all of the
evidence, the court granted the defendant's motion." When the Government
appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed
the appeal holding that the double jeopardy clause barred further prosecution
of the defendant." On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to dismiss the Government's appeal
and remanded the case to that court. 9° The Supreme Court held that the Gov-
ernment's appeal invaded no interest protected by the double jeopardy clause,
because the defendant had sought on his own to have his trial ended without
any decision as to his factual guilt or innocence."
In reaching its decision in Scott, the Supreme Court outlined what it con-
sidered two basic principles governing double jeopardy. First, a defendant who
a Id. at 17. The Court explained that a judge is to present the case to the jury if the
evidence and the inferences therefrom when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution
would warrant the jury's finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Court
reasoned that given the requirements for entry of a judgment of acquittal, the purposes of the
double jeopardy prohibition would be ignored if the government was given a "second bite at the
apple." Id,
64 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
86 Id. at 87.
86
 Id. at 84.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. The Court of Appeals explained that the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), prohibited further proceedings. in Jenkins, the Supreme
Court held that the government has no right to appeal whenever further proceedings would be re-
quired that would be devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the of-
fense charged. Id. at 370.
9° United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978). In Scott, the Supreme Court stated
that Jenkins placed too great an emphasis on the defendant's right to have his guilt or innocence
decided by the first jury. Id. at 87.
91 Id. The general rule is that when a defendant moves for a mistrial or otherwise seeks
to terminate the proceedings he has made a deliberate choice to take the case from the initial trier
of fact and therefor the double jeopardy clause imposes no bar to reprosecution. United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971). An exception to this rule has been recognized, however, where
the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was prosecutorial or judicial con-
duct intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S.
Ct. 2083, 2089 (1982). For an earlier case discussing this exception, see United States v. Dinitz,
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successfully appeals a conviction on any grounds other than the insufficiency of
the evidence is not protected from reprosecution by the double jeopardy bar. 92
The Court explained that requiring a defendant who is able to upset his convic-
tion on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence to stand trial again
is not the sort of governmental oppression the double jeopardy clause was in-
tended to prevent." Second, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury
verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient
to convict, is final and the defendant may not be retried." The Scott Court
stated that permitting a second trial after an acquittal would present an unac-
ceptably high risk that the Government's superior resources might wear down
the defendant so that "even if innocent he may be found guilty ." 96
Although the Court recognized that the Government, with all its "re-
sources and power," should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to con-
vict, 96
 it nonetheless held that when a defendant chooses to terminate his trial
on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence this concern about governmental
oppression did not apply. 97
 The Court said that retrial after such an election by
a defendant was allowed." According to the Scott Court, the double jeopardy
bar did not preclude retrial where a defendant successfully avoided conviction
on the basis of what it termed a legal claim rather than on an assertion that the
Government had failed to make out its case. 99
 The Court reasoned that when
the defendant asserts the presence of a legal or procedural defect in his trial, the
defendant would avoid conviction if retrial were not permitted even though the
Government's case might be able to satisfy the trier of fact of his guilt.'" In ef-
fect, a legal claim only goes to the procedural effectiveness of the particular
trial, and is not dependent upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. As long
as the trial is dismissed for reasons unrelated to the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence, the accused may be retried."'
After determining that a dismissal pursuant to a "legal" claim does not
bar retrial, the Court contrasted the situation with one where the State seeks to
reprosecute a defendant who had either been found not guilty or had at least
allowed the issue of guilt to be submitted to the trier of fact.'" According to the
Court, the double jeopardy clause bars retrial following an acquittal because
permitting a second prosecution would create an unacceptably high risk that
424 U.S. 600 (1976). For a good discussion of this area of double jeopardy law, see Comment,
Double Jeopardy: An Illusory Remedy For Governmental Overreaching At Trial, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 795
(1980).
92
 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 90-91.
" Id. at 91.
94 Id.
95 Id. (quoting United States v. Greene, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957)).
96 Id. at 96.
97 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
'" 
Id.
"I Id. at 101.
102 Id. at 91.
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the Government's superior resources would wear down a defendant so that
even though innocent, he may be found guilty."' The Court defined an acquit-
tal as a "ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually representing] a
resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged.'"" The Court reasoned, however, that when
a defendant's first trial is terminated for reasons completely unrelated to fac-
tual guilt or innocence, the trier of fact has not found the defendant innocent in
any sense of the word and therefore retrial is appropriate."' Thus, prior to
Tibbs, where a defendant either established his innocence at trial or established
on appeal that sufficient evidence to convict had not been introduced at trial,
the double jeopardy bar of the fifth amendment would apply. Where a convic-
tion was overturned on a procedural or "legal" claim, the defendant would be
retried.
II. TIBBS V. FLORIDA
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Florida
Supreme Court's ruling that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial
where a defendant is able to reverse his conviction based on the weight of the
evidence.'" The majority opinion, written by justice O'Connor," 7 began by
reaffirming the general rule of United States v. Ball that a criminal defendant
who successfully appeals a judgment against him may be retried.'" The Court
then recognized the two major considerations behind the Ball rule.'°° First,
society has a strong interest in punishing those who violate criminal laws."°
Second, although Burks created an exception by prohibiting retrial following a
reversal based on the insufficiency of the evidence, retrial of a defendant who
obtains a reversal of his conviction is not normally the sort of governmental op-
pression the double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent.'" Justice O'Con-
nor then moved directly to a discussion of the exception Burks created to the
general rule of Ball." 2
'°' Id.
' 04 Id. at 97 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977)).
105 Id. at 98 n.11.
'" Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2213 (1982).
"7
 Id.
"B Id. at 2217 (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896)).
"9 Id.
"° Id. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
1 " Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217 (1982). See 'United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 91 (1978). The Tibbs Court explained that Burks was a narrow exception to the Ball rule.
Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2217.
For examples of situations where the Supreme Court has found that the sort of
governmental oppression the double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent exists, see Oregon
v. Kennedy, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2089 (1982) (Retrial forbidden when prosecution or court intends
to provoke defendant into moving for a mistrial); Arizona v. Washington, '434 U.S. 497, 503
(1978) (Second prosecution not allowed following mistrial declared over defendant's objection
unless 'manifest necessity' demonstrated); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)
(Double jeopardy clause bars retrial following an acquittal).
1 " Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2217. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16
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In Burks, as noted, the Supreme Court held that where an appellate court
reverses a conviction based on the insufficiency of the evidence, the double
jeopardy clause bars further prosecution. 113 The Tibbs Court, in explaining
Burks, stated that evidence is legally insufficient when the government's case is
so weak that the evidence should never have been submitted to the trier of
fact. 14 In effect, the standard of legal insufficiency is met when no rational
factfinder could convict the defendant based upon the evidence presented.'"
Turning to the rationale behind Burks, the Tibbs Court stated that the
Burks' exception rested on two closely related policies." 5 First, judgments of ac-
quittal are given special weight in a double jeopardy analysis."' Noting that a
reversal by an appellate court based on the insufficiency of the evidence is the
functional equivalent of an acquittal, the Tibbs Court reasoned that a reversal
based on the insufficiency of the evidence also should absolutely shield the
defendant from retrial_ 118 Second, in Burks, the Court stated that under the
double jeopardy protection the prosecution should not be given a second op-
portunity to produce evidence it failed to present in the first trial." 9 In effect, if
the government were allowed repeated attempts to convict, an unfair burden
would be placed on the defendant because the repeated attempts would create
the grave risk that a defendant may be convicted purely as a result of govern-
mental perseverance. 120 The Tibbs Court concluded, therefore, that when a
reversal is based upon the prosecution's failure to produce sufficient evidence
to prove its case, the double jeopardy clause prevents the government from
making another attempt at conviction. 121 This, of course, is to restate the
holding of Burks.
After examining the policies behind the Burks decision, the Tibbs Court ex-
plained that these policies are not as forceful when a conviction is reversed
based on the weight of the evidence.'" The Court noted that an appellate
judge's disagreement with a jury's resolution of conflicting evidence does not
mean that acquittal by the jury was the only proper verdict.'" Suggesting that
in such a case the appellate court is really acting as a "thirteenth juror," the
Court reasoned that this "difference of opinion" was similar to the situation of
a deadlocked jury. 124 Earlier decisions, the Court recognized, consistently held
that the double jeopardy clause presents no bar to retrial when a jury is unable
(1978).
" 3 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2217. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 18.
114 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2217-18.
'" Id. at 2218.
1 " Id.
1 " Id. See, e.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curium).
18 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
"9 Id. See Burks v. United States 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
120
 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2218. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 187-88
(1955); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 119, 130 (1980).
1 " Id.
122 Id.
128 Id.
124 Id.
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to reach a verdict.'" After making this analogy, the Court stated that an appel-
late reversal on weight should not be given the special deference given acquit-
tals. 126
The Tibbs Court explained that a reversal based on weight can only occur
after the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence for the case to be sub-
mitted to a jury and has convinced the jury to convict.'" Because a reversal
based on weight can occur only after the jury has decided against acquittal and
returned a guilty verdict, the Court reasoned that a reversal based on weight
simply gives a defendant a second opportunity to secure an acquittal.'" While
the Court admitted that allowing retrial following a reversal based on weight
affords the prosecution a second try as well, the Court explained that because
the State already had secured a conviction based on technically sufficient
evidence, the State had little to gain and everything to lose on retrial.'" The
Court stated that the double jeopardy prohibition should not require society to
pay the high price of immunity for every defendant who is able to get his con-
viction reversed by an appellate court any more than society should be forced
to have every defendant who fails to get an error-free trial set free.' 3° The
Court concluded that the second opportunity that the state will receive as a
result of the Court's ruling in Tibbs does not involve the type of oppression out-
lawed by the double jeopardy clause."'
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in Tibbs and was joined by three
other Justices.'" The dissent began by recognizing that the meaning of the
double jeopardy clause in any criminal proceeding is not always clear.'" The
opinion then noted that to sustain Tibbs' conviction, the prosecution was re-
quired not only to produce evidence sufficient to persuade a rational factfinder
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the federal constitutional standard
announced in Jackson v. Virginia,'" but also, under Florida law, to establish
that the conviction was not against the weight of the evidence.'" According to
the dissent, because the Florida Supreme Court found Tibbs' conviction to be
against the weight of the evidence and reversed, the prosecution failed as a
12° Id. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 401-02 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892).
126
 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2219.
127 Id.
126 Id. The double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial of a defendant who is able to obtain
an acquittal.
In a footnote, the majority suggested that a reversal based on weight does not always
require the prosecution to produce new evidence at a second trial. The court reasoned that if two
juries convict a defendant an appellate court will be much more reluctant to grant a new trial. Id.
at n.18.
126 Id. at n.19.
"° Id.
" I Id.
'" Id. at 2221.
1 ' 9 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
194 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
'" Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2221 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
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matter of Florida law to produce adequate evidence.' 36 The dissent assumed,
therefore, that if the State produced the same evidence again on retrial, the
state appellate courts would again have to reverse any conviction.' 37 Because
the State had a full and fair opportunity to present its case and the reviewing
court held that the evidence was inadequate under Florida law, the dissent
reasoned that the only possible point in conducting a new trial would be to
allow the State to produce additional evidence.'" The dissent was not willing
to agree with the majority that reprosecution under such circumstances did not
violate the double jeopardy clause." 9
Justice White then noted that the majority correctly recognized that if the
evidence were inadequate under federal law, Burks precluded retrial.'" The
dissent disagreed, however, with the majority's decision to allow the State
another attempt to convict where state law holds the proof inadequate."' The
opinion explained that while Jackson established the minimum federal standard
for upholding a conviction, Florida law imposed the additional requirement
that a conviction could be overturned if it was against the weight of the
evidence."' The dissent reasoned that the majority failed to explain why the
State should be , allowed a second chance at convicting a defendant when the
conviction is reversed upon inadequate proof under state law, but not when the
reversal is based on federal evidentiary grounds.'" According to the opinion,
in both cases the State has failed to present evidence adequate to sustain the
conviction, in both cases the State has the same 'interests in overcoming the
evidentiary shortcomings, and in both cases the interests of the defendant in
avoiding further prosecution are the same. 144 In response to the majority's
justification for the distinction, the dissent reasoned that the double jeopardy
bar should not depend upon a finding that an "acquittal was the only proper
verdict. " 147
 The dissent stated the important factor in determining whether the
double jeopardy clause barred retrial was that the prosecution failed to prove
the evidentiary requirements as a matter of state law . 146 The majority ruling,
according to the dissent, gives the prosecution, not the defendant, a needed
second opportunity.' 47
136 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
137- Id. (White, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that although courts in Florida were no
longer allowed to reverse convictions on grounds of evidentiary weight, other jurisdictions, in-
cluding the federal government, make use of a similar rule with respect to evidentiary weight. Id.
at 2221-22 n.". (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the issue remains an important one for future liti-
gation in those jurisdictions with such a rule.
"8 Id. at 2222. (White, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
' 4 ' Id. (White, J., dissenting).
142
 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
' 44
 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. (White, J., dissenting).
147 Id,_(White,.1, dissenting).
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Finally, the dissent examined the policies underlying the double jeopardy
clause. The important question in a double jeopardy analysis, in Justice
White's view, was whether the reversal stemmed from a failure of proof at trial
after the State had been given a full opportunity to present its case.'" Quoting
from the majority opinion in Tibbs, the dissent stated the prosecution should
not be given a second chance to supply evidence it failed to produce in the first
proceeding. 149 The dissent explained that the double jeopardy prohibition
prevents the State from "honing its trial strategies" and using successive trials
to perfect its evidence, thereby creating the risk that a defendant may be found
guilty through sheer governmental perseverance.'" When a court allows retrial
following a reversal due to a failure of proof, regardless of whether the proof
was insufficient or lacking in weight, in justice White's view the State with all
its resources is being allowed repeated attempts to convict. 15 ' According to the
dissent, therefore, the only proper distinction for determining whether the dou-
ble jeopardy clause applied was that between procedural reversals and eviden-
tiary reversals. 152 In essence, whether the appellate court characterizes its
reversal as based upon either the insufficiency or the weight of the evidence, the
real question in determining whether the double jeopardy bar should apply is
whether the state has met the evidentiary standards for upholding a conviction.
To allow a second attempt at conviction following any reversal based on
evidentiary grounds is, in Justice White's view, to create the potential for the
type of oppression the double jeopardy bar was designed to prevent: the risk of
convicting an innocent defendant.'"
III. THE RATIONALE OF TIBBS V. FLORIDA
A. Validity of the Distinction Between the Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
The weight and the sufficiency of the evidence are two distinct concepts.' 54
As a practical matter, however, the distinction is not always easy to make. Suf-
ficiency is said to be a test of adequacy;'" in a criminal proceeding, a court's
determination that the evidence is legally insufficient means that the prosecu-
tion has failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 156 The
government must present sufficient evidence before the trial judge will submit
'" Id. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting). See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43 (1981).
149 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2222-23 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Tibbs v.
Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2218).
150 Id. at 2222-23 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2218).
"I Id. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting). See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187
(1957).
151 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting).
"s Id. (White, J., dissenting).
154 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981) (per curium).
"5 Id.
' 56 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1978). See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at
1123 ("Sufficient evidence is such evidence, in character, weight or amount, as will legally justify
the judicial or official action demanded.") (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1285 (5th ed.
1979)).
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the case to the trier of fact.'" If the government is able to clear this hurdle, then
the factfinder may weigh the evidence.'" Evidentiary weight is a rather more
difficult idea to define.'" The weight of the evidence is essentially the decision
of the trier of fact that the greater amount of proffered evidence supports one
side ofthe facts or another. 16° Weight, so understood, is determined by the con-
sideration made by the jury after all of the evidence is submitted. 16 '
Different standards of appellate review are held to govern reversals based
on weight and thoSe based on insufficiency. 162 When the motion to reverse a
conviction is based on the insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court is
required to approach the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the
government.' 63
 The court must deny the motion for acquittal if substantial
evidence exists to justify the inference of guilt.'" Where a reviewing court must
determine whether to reverse a conviction based on weight of the evidence, the
power of the court to set aside a conviction is broader.' 63 The court is not re-
quired to view the evidence more favorably for either party, but instead may
weigh conflicting evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses.' 66
Although the evidence might be technically sufficient, the reviewing court may
set aside the conviction if the preponderance of the evidence goes heavily
against the guilty verdict.'" Although this distinction can be stated easily, it is
in fact difficult to make. This section of the casenote will demonstrate that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Tibbs, by giving such importance to the distinction
between reversals based on either the weight or the sufficiency of the evidence,
has created problems for reviewing courts.
The problems created by the distinction between reversals based on the in-
sufficiency of evidence and the weight of evidence are demonstrated by the
" 7 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 16. In Burks, the Supreme Court said insufficien-
cy of the evidence means "The government's case was so lacking it should not have even been
submitted to the jury." Id. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 2549, p. 639 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
"a 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 2551 p. 664 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
139 See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981) (per curium) ("Weight, at least
in theory, is a somewhat more subjective concept [than sufficiency].").
' 6° Id.
' 61 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 12, p. 299 (3d ed. 1940) (I/Sleight . . . [has] no applica-
tion until the evidence is all introduced and the jury is ready to retire.").
162 See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d S 553, 246-48
(1982). Wright distinguishes a motion for a new trial on the ground the the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence from a motion for a judgment of acquittal under FED. R. OF CRIM. P. 29.
Id. According to Wright, when a court is asked to rule on a motion for judgment of acquittal, it
must approach the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the government and assume the
truth of the evidence offered by the prosecution. Id. at 245. In contrast, when a court is ruling on
a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, it may
consider the credibility of witnesses and grant a new trial if a miscarriage of justice may have
resulted, Id. at 245-46.
1 " State v. Wilson, 267 N.W. 2d 550, 553 (N.D. 1978).
164 Id.
166 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d 5 553,
245-46 (1982).
166 United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).
167 Id.
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state court rulings in Tibbs. When Delbert Tibbs appealed his original convic-
tion to the Florida Supreme Court, his principal contention was that the totali-
ty of the evidence was insufficient to place him at or near the scene of the
murder and rape, or to establish his identity as the perpetrator beyond all
reasonable doubt.'" Under Florida law, the prosecution had to produce
evidence which would allow the trial court to determine after a careful scrutiny
of the victim's testimony, that the conviction was "not unmerited.'"" The
Florida Supreme Court reversed Tibbs' conviction and remanded the case for
a new trial."° In so doing, the court did not expressly state whether the reversal
was based on either the insufficiency or weight of the evidence. At the time of
the state supreme court's decision, however, Burks had not yet been decided.
Thus, there was no need for the court to specify the precise grounds for the
evidentiary reversal because retrial presumably would have been constitutional
whether the reversal was based on either weight or insufficiency."'
While the Florida Supreme Court drew no distinction between the weight
and the sufficiency of the evidence, much of the language in its opinion sug-
gested that the grounds were insufficiency of the evidence. After the Florida
Supreme Court discussed a number of infirmities in the State's evidence, 1 ^ 2 it
added that several features of the victim's testimony also cast doubt on her
believability."s The court said that although the resolution of facts was usually
the province of the jury, the Florida legislature " 4 had directed the court to
review the "entire record."'" The court then quoted from an earlier opinion
168 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1976).
169 Id. at 790. Under Florida law, two elements were required whenever the State sought
to convict a defendant based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. First, the rape
victim must testify against her assailant. Id. Second, the trial court must determine that the con-
viction was not unmerited. Id. The first requirement, that of direct testimony, was clearly
satisfied because Nadeau did testify that Tibbs committed the crime. Id.
1 " Id. at 791.
'" State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1979)). Although some
states, in pre-Burks decisions prohibited retrial following an appellate reversal based on the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence under state law (see, e.g., People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App. 2d 281, 241
N.E.2d 653 (1968)), Florida did not. See McArthur v. State, 351 So., 2d 972, 978 (Fla. 1977)
(Boyd, J., dissenting) ("Although some jurisdictions permit a new trial of an accused ... when
convictions are reversed due to insufficient evidence, it is my opinion that such action constitutes
double jeopardy. . I therefore would dissent to that portion of the opinion requiring a new
trial").
'" Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1976). See supra note 26 and accompanying
text for a detailed description of these infirmities.
"3 Id. at 790. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for these discrepancies in the vic-
tim's testimony.
174 See Fla. Slat. 5 921.141 (1975) which provided in pertinent part:
(4) Review of Judgment and Sentence—the judgment of conviction and sentence of
death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida ... Id.
See also Fla. R. App. Pro. 616(b) (rev. 1962) which provides in pertinent part:
... upon an appeal from the judgment of a defendant who has been sentenced to
death the appellate court shall review the evidence to determine if the interests of
justice require a new trial, whether the insufficiency of the evidence is a ground of
appeal or not.
1 " Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976).
788	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 24:771
which stated that "human liberty should not be forfeited by a conviction under
evidence which is not sufficient to convince a fair and impartial mind of the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 76 This language echoes the
definition of the sufficiency of evidence necessary to convict. '" Specially con-
curring, Justice Boyd spoke of the "weakness and inadequacy" of the State's
evidence, and said that the record did not support the imposition of either
capital punishment or imprisonment.'" Taken together, these statements
would seem to indicate that the court was analyzing the problem in terms of the
sufficiency of the evidence.
After the case was remanded and the trial court found that retrial was
precluded by Burks, the appellate court was faced with a difficult question. The
appellate court could either characterize the Florida Supreme Court's earlier
reversal of Tibbs' conviction as one based on the insufficiency of the evidence
and in so doing preclude retrial under Burks, or the court could view the rever-
sal as based on some other grounds and allow the defendant to be retried. 19
The appellate court stated that the majority of the Justices in Tibbs' reversal
reviewed the entire record and found that the testimony was not believable or
substantial in character. 1 "D The court therefore maintained that the earlier
reversal was not based on "pure insufficiency."'" Instead, the court decided
that the evidence was weak and contradictory.'" In determining that the
earlier reversal in Tibbs was based on weight, the court compared the reversal
to a long line of earlier state supreme court decisions in which the evidence that
had led to conviction was scrutinized.'" The language of these cases did not
make clear whether the grounds of the reversals were for insufficiency or
weight, but after the appellate court reviewed the decisions, the court conclud-
ed that the reversals were based on the weight of the evidence.'" The court
16 Id. (quoting McNeil v. State, 104 Fla. 360, 366, 139 So. 791, 792 (1932)).
177 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
' 78 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 798, 792 (Fla. 1976).
179 State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). After Burks, the dou-
ble jeopardy implications of two categories of appellate reversals were clearly defined. A reversal
on the ground of trial error did not bar retrial, but a reversal based on the insufficiency of the evi-
dence did, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). The United States Supreme Court had
recognized the existence of a third category of reversal (one based on the weight of the evidence)
in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978), but did not express opinion as to the double jeop-
ardy consequences of such a reversal, Id. at 26 n.10.
' 8° State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
' 8 ' Id.
182 Id.
185 Id.
"4 Id. at 387-88. Three of these cases were similar to the reversal in Tibbs. In McNeil v.
State, 104 Fla. 360, 139 So. 791 (1932), the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a sentence of life
imprisonment for armed robbery even though there was direct evidence identifying the defend-
ant as the person guilty. Id. at 362, 193 So. at 792 In McNeil, the court stated that the evidence
was not satisfactory. Id. In Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So. 2d 106 (1944), the court reversed
a rape conviction where the only evidence of guilt was the victim's testimony. Id. at 737, 19 So.
2d at 110. In reversing the conviction, the court said that after a full and fair consideration of the
entire record, the inconclusiveness of the evidence offered to establish the elements of the crime
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determined, therefore, that the reversal in Tibbs was based on the weight of the
evidence. 185 Consequently, Tibbs' retrial would not be precluded by Burks.
Tibbs appealed the appellate court's decision to the state supreme
court.'" Tibbs asked the court to hold that its earlier reversal was based on the
insufficiency of the evidence.'" The opinion of the court began by explaining
that the cases the appellate court relied upon as support for its decision were ac-
tually based on insufficiency and not weight. 188 The court noted that the
"weight" cases which the appellate court had considered actually involved in-
stances of the state's failure to prove a material element of the offense
charged.'" Although the court stated this did not mean that no Florida ap-
pellate reversal had ever relied explicitly on evidentiary weight as the sole basis
for reversal, the court failed to cite any decision in which it had done so.' 5° The
court held that from that point on convictions could not be reversed on appeal
on the ground that the weight of the evidence was "tenuous or in-
substantial." 1 " The court explained that eliminating this category of appellate
reversals from Florida law would take away any temptation appellate courts
might have to characterize their reversals as based on weight in order to avoid
the double jeopardy bar. 192
dictated the granting of a new trial. Id. Finally, in Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138, 50 So. 749
(1909), the court reversed three earlier convictions stating that after "carefully weighing the
evidence we are irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence ad-
duced to warrant the verdict .... " Id. at 151-52, 50 So. at 754
' 8 ' State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386,388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
186
 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
187 Id. Prior to this decision, the Florida Supreme Court had not decided the double
jeopardy consequences of appellate reversals based on evidentiary weight. See McArthur v.
Nourse, 369 So. 2d 578, 581 n.11 (Fla. 1979).
188
 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1124.
/89 Id.
' 90 Id. Although the court stated that two state district court decisions had recognized
that evidentiary weight could serve as a basis for appellate reversals of convictions, the supreme
court's characterization of its earlier reversal in Tibbs as based on weight remains unusual. In
Sosa v, Maxwell, 234 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970), a reviewing court characterized
an earlier state supreme court reversal as based on weight and allowed retrial. Id. at 691-92. The
Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs stated that the reversal in Sosa was actually based on insuffi-
ciency, rather than the weight, of the evidence. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1125. The supreme
court stated that the district court simply interpreted its original decision erroneously. Id.
Because the district courts's interpretation was pre-Burks, retrial would have been allowed in
either case.
The Florida Supreme Court's characterization of its earlier reversal in Tibbs as based
on the weight of the evidence is brought under further doubt by the second decision it referred to
as relying on evidentiary weight to reverse a conviction. In Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 284 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970), the district court reversed a conviction, even though it recognized that
the evidence was technically sufficient. Id. at 290. On appeal, the state supreme court unan-
imously reversed the district court, stating that once a reviewing court determines the evidence to
be technically sufficient its duty was to affirm the conviction. Smith v. State, 249 So. 2d 16, 18
(Fla. 1971).
19 ' Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1125. The court said eliminating this category would
avoid disparate appellate results and the court's having to review reversals to determine whether
they were based . on . insufficiency or weight. Id.
152 Id. at 1125-26. Thus, from that point on a conviction in Florida would stand even if it
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After determining that this "distinction" between evidentiary weight and
sufficiency should no longer remain in Florida law, the court nonetheless went
on to hold that Tibbs' reversal "was one of those rare instances" in which
reversal was based on evidentiary weight.' 93 The court stated that Nadeau's
testimony alone was legally sufficient and that the court had in effect reweighed
the evidence supporting Tibbs' conviction.'" The Florida Supreme Court said
that despite language in its original opinion that there was a very real possibili-
ty that Tibbs had nothing to do with these crimes, only by "stretching" its
analysis could the supreme court possibly characterize its previous reversal as
based on the insufficiency of the evidence.'" Inasmuch as Tibbs' conviction
was therefore based on the weight of the evidence, the Florida Supreme Court
concluded the double jeopardy bar did not apply.' 96
The difficulty of both making and applying the distinction between the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence created by the United States Supreme
Court in Tibbs 197 is demonstrated by the conflicts and confusion is these earlier
state court rulings. First, the state supreme court disagreed with the appellate
court on every case the appellate court cited as being reversed on weight.'"
Although the Supreme Court was looking retroactively at pre-Burks decisions
in which the need to distinguish between reversals based on weight or sufficien-
cy of the evidence was not crucial, this disagreement demonstrates the dif-
ficulties an appellate court faces when it attempts to classify a reversal as based
on weight or sufficiency of the evidence. The major reason for the difficulty in
determining whether a conviction is based on insufficient evidence or whether
the evidence is technically sufficient but the conviction is against the weight of
the evidence is that the standards for determining legally sufficient evidence are
not purely objective.' 99
When an appeals court is asked to overturn a conviction based on eviden-
tiary insufficiency, it must determine whether substantial evidence exists to
was against The great weight of the evidence. The court noted that new trials could still be granted
"in the interests of justice." This, the court said, would allow appellate courts to correct fun-
damental injustices unrelated to evidentiary shortcomings. Id. at 1126.
193 Id. As Justice Sundberg pointed out in dissent, this conclusion was reached after the
majority of the court had already conceded that it was virtually impossible to characterize earlier
reversals as based on weight or insufficiency. Id. at 1127 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 1126.
' 93 Id.
' 96 Id. at 1127.
197 in referring to Tibbs as "creating" this distinction, the discussion is concerned only
with the different double jeopardy consequences that have been accorded to these two reversals.
The general distinction between the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence existed long before
Tibbs.
' 99 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1124 (Fla. 1981) (per curium).
199 Although the jury's role in balancing conflicting evidence is in theory contrasted to
that of the judge who must decide where there is "enough" evidence to allow the case to be sub-
mitted to the trier of fact, it is apparent that both the judge and the jury do some "weighing." See
generally Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J.
1149, 1155-57 (1960). When a case is tried to a judge, clearly these roles become even more en-
twined.
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support the trial court's decision that the standard for legally sufficient
evidence has been met. 20° Confusion between the weight and the sufficiency of
evidence will result because when a reviewing court is deciding whether
"substantial" evidence exists it must, at least to some degree, conduct its own
evaluation of the evidence. Because the standard for legal sufficiency of the
evidence in many cases will naturally require the reviewing court to do some
weighing, 20 ' there is often at best a fine line between a reversal based on weight
and one based on insufficiency. This lack of objective standards for determin-
ing evidentiary sufficiency is apparent in Tibbs' case, where the standard for
legal sufficiency under Florida law was met if direct testimony by the victim
was obtained, provided this testimony would not lead to an unmerited convie-
tion. 202 For the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether the conviction
was merited, the court had to examine the record to see if the other evidence
adduced at trial supported the victim's testimony against Tibbs."' In conduct-
ing this examination, the court inevitably had to make some judgment of its
own about whether the evidence presented justified a guilty verdict. In essence,
therefore, some weighing was required by the standard for evidentiary suffi-
ciency. In reversing Tibbs' original conviction, the Florida Supreme Court
identified numerous infirmities in the State's case and explained that several
features of the victim's testimony created doubt about her believability. 204
Although these discrepancies would seem to indicate Tibbs' conviction was
unmerited and that, therefore, the Florida standard for legally sufficient
evidence was not met, the state supreme court later characterized its earlier
reversal of Tibbs' conviction as based on the weight of the evidence."' The
court stated that only by "stretching" its analysis could it term its earlier re-
versal as one based on the insufficiency of the evidence, 266 disregarding the in-
herent weighing required by the state standard for evidentiary sufficiency.
The second major problem with the distinction between the weight and
suffiency of the evidence is that by creating two classes of reversals, one that
200 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
"' See e.g., State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 565, 617 P.2d 820, 823 (1980) ("Substantial
evidence ... is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a
man of reasonal caution to reach a conclusion. It is evidence which a reasonable mind might ac-
cept as adequate to support such a conclusion."); State v True, 438 A.2d 460, 471 (1981) ("The
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient to support a rape conviction unless the
testimony is inherently improbable or incredible and does not meet the test of common sense.").
For other examples of standards of sufficiency that necessarily involve some element of weighing,
see State v. Harrington, 440 A.2d 1078, 1079 (1982); Williams v. State, 423 N.E. 2d 598,
599-600 (1981); State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 554-55, 633 P.2d 355, 363-64 (1981); State v.
Schad, 129 Ariz. 557, 571, 633 P.2d 366, 381 (1981); United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 35-36
(4th Cir. 1969); State v. Lima, 64 Haw. 470, 473, 643 P.2d 536, 539 (1982).
202 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789-90 (Fla. 1976). See supra notes 166-68 and ac-
companying text.
203 Id. at 790.
"4 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The Florida Supreme Court stated it had
"considerable doubt" that Tibbs committed the crimes. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d at 790.
"5
 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla. 1981) (per curium).
"6 Id.
792	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 !Vol. 24:771
allows for retrials and one that does not, the United States Supreme Court in
Tibbs has given reviewing judges"' a difficult choice. If an appellate court
decides to reverse a conviction that is not warranted by the evidence adduced at
trial, the court must either say that the evidence was insufficient and thereby
set the defendant free, or base its reversal on the weight of the evidence and in
so doing allow a second tria1. 296 Because a reviewing court will often be faced
with an evidentiary standard that involves some weighing, even the most con-
scientious judge could not be faulted for choosing the "safer" ground of revers-
ing on the weight of the evidence, thereby allowing the state to retry a defend-
ant. 2 D9 In so doing, the court would avoid the public outrage that often follows
a court's decision to set a convicted defendant free.
207 Although Florida appellate courts are no longer allowed to reverse convictions based
on the weight of the evidence, reviewing courts in other jurisdictions sometimes rely upon the
weight of the evidence to overturn convictions. Tibbs, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2216 n.12 (1982). For ex-
ample, Trial Rule 59(a)(4) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure specifies as a ground for relief
in the motion to correct errors that the verdict or decision is "contrary to the evidence." Trial
Rule 59(J)(7) provides that the trial court shall grant a new trial if the decision is found to be
against the weight of the evidence. This rule is incorporated into criminal practice by Rule 16
of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Thompson, Reversals For Insufficient Evidence: The
Emerging Doctrine of Appellate Acquittal, 8 IND, L. REV. 497, 499 n.3 (1974); Moore v.
State, Ind., 403 N.E. 2d 335, 336 (1980). See also Ricketts v. Williams, 242 Ga. 303,
304, 248, S.E.2d 673, 674 (1978) (Georgia reviewing courts permitted to reverse based on
weight.).
In addition, a number of federal courts under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which authorizes a new trial if it is "in the interests of justice," have
recognized the authority of a trial judge to set aside a conviction that is against the weight of the
evidence. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2216 n.12. For purposes of the present analysis, it must
be noted that under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a motion for a new trial on the
ground that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence can be combined with a motion for a
judgement of acquittal under Rule 29. Ste, e.g., United States v. Rojas, 574 F. 2d 476, 476 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Kohlman, 491 F.2d 1250, 1251 (5th Cir. 1974).
208 This second trial following a reversal based on weight will result in all federal courts,
and also in those states that view the double jeopardy provisions of their own constitutions as im-
posing no requirements 'greater than the federal law demands. See supra notes 51-52.
Additionally, it must be recognized that even in jurisdictions bound by the Supreme
Court's ruling in Tibbs an appellate or reviewing court would not always have such a "choice."
If the standard of sufficiency truly did not involve any weighing of the evidence, or the evidence
was so clearly lacking that in no way could it be characterized as sufficient, then the court ob-
viously would be required to characterize the evidence as insufficient and in so doing set the de-
fendant free.
209 See Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting) ("It must also be
noted that judges having doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence under the Jackson standard
may prefer to reverse on the weight of the evidence, since retrial would not be barred."). The
Supreme Court in other double jeopardy decisions has expressed concern over the implications
its rulings would have on appellate judges. For example, in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332 (1975), the Court explained that the rationale for the general rule of Ball that a defendant
who is able to get his conviction overturned on appeal may be retried was that it "is simply ...
fairer to both the defendant and the Government." Id. at 343 n.11. This explanation for the Ball
rule rests on the assumption that the rule "enhances the probability that appellate courts will be
more vigilant to strike down previous convictions ... tainted with reversible error." United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966). The Court has stated that if the rule were otherwise,
appellate 'courts would become less zealous in their protection of defendant's rights. United
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Once again, the earlier state court decisions provide the most vivid exam-
ple of the difficult choices created by Tibbs. When the Florida Supreme Court
was faced with the task of characterizing its earlier reversal as based on either
weight or sufficiency, the court knew that "choosing" the latter would set
Tibbs free."° The court determined that the reversal was based on weight even
though the state standard for sufficiency provided that a conviction could not
stand if unmerited; the court was unable to point to any other case in Florida
history where it reversed a conviction based on weight; 211 three justices who
joined in the original opinion reversing Tibbs' conviction dissented in the
court's decision to allow Tibbs to be retried; 2 i 2 and the court's prior opinion
reversing Tibbs's conviction had quoted an earlier state decision that spoke in
terms usually connected with an insufficiency analysis. 213 The ability of the
Florida Supreme Court to label its reversal as based on weight despite these
factors demonstrates that the distinction between weight and sufficiency of the
evidence is not a workable one. If a reviewing court can characterize its re-
versal as based on weight despite an earlier published opinion with language
suggesting that the evidence was insufficient, clearly a court examining
evidence for the first time could use a sufficiency analysis but term its reversal
as based on weight. It would seem likely, therefore, that some courts might be
unwilling to set defendants free and would avoid characterizing reversals as
based upon sufficiency.
This "compromise" of setting aside a defendant's conviction but charac-
terizing the reversal as based on weight, and thus allowing retrial, will serve to
limit the effectiveness of the exception created by Burks. By allowing an ap-
pellate court the option of reversing an unmerited conviction without
precluding the retrial of the defendant, Tibbs will inevitably lead to retrial of
defendants who under Burks should not have to face further prosecution.
Defendants who seek reversal of their convictions on the grounds of insufficient
evidence will be faced with the formidable task of persuading a reviewing court
that the evidentiary weighing done by the court should go to the standard for
States v. Tateo, 337 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
210 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1122, 1127 (Fla. 1981) (per curium).
" 1 Id. at 1124-25. Chief Justice Sundberg, who concurred in part and dissented in part
of the state supreme court's opinion, said not only would the original reversal on weight have
been "novel," it would also have been unlawful. He said the court's only authority was to
reverse based on the insufficiency of the evidence, explaining that earlier decisions had recog-
nized that appellate courts in Florida were not allowed to reweigh evidence. Id. at 1127 (Sund-
berg, J., dissenting). See Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56, 58 (1977); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d
13, 16 (1977).
212 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1127-31. Justices Sundberg, England, and Boyd all
dissented in the state supreme court's decision to allow retrial. Id. Chief Justice Sundberg sug-
gested that the double jeopardy clause should prohibit retrial whenever the appellate court
reverses "for a substantive lack of evidence to support the verdict." Id. at 1128. Justice England
stated that Tibbs should be discharged "in the interests of justice," while Justice Boyd expained
that Tibbs' original reversal was based on evidentiary insufficiency. Id. at 1130-31.
7" See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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legal sufficiency, and not to a more general re-weighing of the evidence. 214 The
defendant must convince the court that in its examination of the evidence, it is
reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, and not weight. Only if the defend-
ant is successful in persuading the appellate court that the evidence was insuffi-
cient will he be free from further prosecution.
The objection that'Burks would be undermined if different outcomes could
be reached depending on how the reversal was characterized did not seem to
trouble the Supreme Court. In Tibbs, the majority of the United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument on two grounds. 215 First, the majority
said that trial and appellate judges often distinguish between evidentiary
weight and sufficiency. 2" The Tibbs Court said there was no reason to believe
that its decision would erode the demonstrated ability of judges to distinguish
between evidence that is legally sufficient and that which is not."' Second, the
Court said that its opinion in fackson v. Virginia 218 placed some limitations on an
appellate court's power to mask its reversals as based on weight when they ac-
tually concerned the insufficiency of the evidence. 219
 In Jackson, the Court held
that the due process clause forbids any conviction based on evidence insuffi-
cient to persuade a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 22°
The Tibbs Court maintained that Jackson would set an enforceable lower limit
on a reviewing court's definition of evidentiary sufficiency. 221
 In addition, the
Court stated its belief that appellate judges would faithfully honor their obliga-
tions, and as a result Burks would not be undermined. 222
The majority's reasoning in Tibbs is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,
in support of the Court's belief that reviewing judges are fully able to
distinguish between evidentiary weight and sufficiency, the opinion only cites
decisions that have described the different standards that apply to reversals on
"4 ,Following Burks, at least one commentator suggested that in questionable cases ap-
pellate courts would be less likely to hold evidence insufficient because such a decision would
shield the defendant from further prosecution. Note, Double Jeopardy: When is an Acquittal an Ac-
quittal?, 20 B.C. L. REV. 925, 947 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Double Jeopardy].
C[A]ppellate courts will be less likely to find the evidence insufficient in marginal cases when the
consequence of such a judgment is to immunize the defendant from the possibility of reprosecu-
don."). The Supreme Court's ruling in Tibbs gives reviewing courts an attractive alternative if
they are at all uncertain that the standard for evidentiary sufficiency has been met. By reversing
based on weight, appellate courts will free themselves from having to make a final decision as to
the defendant's guilt. Prior to Tibbs, reviewing courts either had to hold the evidence insufficient,
leaving the defendant free from any further prosecution, or determine that the evidence was suffi-
cient, thereby making a final determination as to to the defendant's guilt. Because reviewing
courts now have the option to reverse based on weight, it will be even more difficult for defend-
ants to get their convictions reversed based on the insufficiency of the evidence.
"$ Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2220 (1982).
216
2 " Id.
216
	
U.S. 307 (1979).
212 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2220 (1982).
220 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
221
 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2220 (1982).
222 Id.
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weight and those on insufficiency.'" In none of these decisions, however, did
an appellate court reverse a conviction on the ground that although the
evidence was technically sufficient, the conviction was against the great
weight. 224 The Tibbs Court, by simply stating that appellate judges are capable
of making this distinction between evidentiary weight and sufficiency, has
failed to give reviewing courts any guidance in applying the different stand-
ards. As was indicated, the difficulty with distinguishing between the weight
and sufficiency of evidence is not in articulating the standards. Courts en-
counter difficulty in applying the standards, and the majority in Tibbs, by
simply stating that judges will faithfully attempt to honor their obligations,
does nothing to lessen this problem.
The second major problem with the majority's assertion that the Tibbs
decision will not undermine Burks is the Court's belief that Jackson provides a
safeguard from violation of the defendant's rights created by Burks. 225 In
Jackson, the Court held that the due process clause required the reversal of a
criminal defendant's conviction if no rational trier of fact could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 226 The majority in Tibbs stated that Jackson im-
posed a constitutional requirement on appellate courts to free defendants who
had been convicted based on insufficient evidence. 227 The effectiveness of the
Jackson safeguard is based on the Court's assumption that an appellate court is
capable of determining whether a "rational trier of fact would have found guilt
723 Id. at n.20.
"4
 See, e.g., United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 714-16 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972);
United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36-37 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969); Dor-
man v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453-54 (1981); Ridley v. State, 236 Ga. 147, 149, 223 S.E.2d 131,
132 (1976); State v. McGranaham, 415 A.2d 1298, 1301-03 (1980); Tyack v. State, 65 Wis. 2d
513, 521, 223 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1974).
It should be noted that, although United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, appears to
involve the reversal of a conviction based on weight, a close reading of that opinion reveals a very
narrow holding. In Weinstein, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a trial judge did not
have the power to dismiss an indictment in the interests of justice if it found the evidence was
legally sufficient. Id. at 715-16. The appeals court did not, however, reverse a conviction based
on weight.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's opinion that reviewing courts are able to distinguish
between reversals based on weight and those based on insufficiency could receive little support
from any pre-Burks decisions that reversed on weight. Because the double jeopardy clause would
have permitted retrial whether a court termed its reversal as based on either weight or sufficiency,
decisions prior to Burks do not "demonstrate" the ability of reviewing judges to distinguish be-
tween the two reversals.
2 " Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2220 (1982). The Court's reliance on the due
process protections of Jackson is based on a belief that appellate courts might attempt to "mask"
their reversals as based on weight even if the courts believed that the evidence was insufficient.
Id. The Court's recognition that "masking" could take place is an indication that the Court also
realizes that the distinction between the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence is not a clear
one.
226
 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A defendant who obtained such a
reversal could not be retried.
227 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2220 (1982).
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beyond a reasonable doubt" without in any way substituting the court's own
judgment for' that of the jury. 228 This assumption is erroneous, however,
because when an appeals court is reviewing the trial record to see if any ra-
tional trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it must necessari-
ly do some weighing of the evidence presented. In order for a court to hold that
a conviction violates the Jackson standard, it must determine that the evidence
was so weak that no rational factfinder could have returned a guilty verdict.
Because a reviewing court must clearly make some judgment concerning the
weight of the evidence when it determines whether a jury acted "rationally,"
the majority's reliance on the due process clause is misplaced. 229 As a result of
the fact that a reviewing court must do some "weighing" of the evidence
whether the reversal is characterized as based upon weight or insufficiency, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the court to determine at what point a
conviction was not only against the weight of the evidence, but also violated the
due process safeguard. The due process protection articulated in Jackson,
therefore, would for the most part be an illusory safeguard for protecting
defendants who under Burks should not have to face further prosecution.
In summary, the distinction between reversals based on weight and those
based on the insufficiency of the evidence is questionable. Because the process
of determining whether evidence is legally sufficient necessarily involves some
element of "weighing," according different double jeopardy consequences to
the two types of reversals is inappropriate. Moreover, courts faced with the dif-
ficult decision of reversing a conviction based either on the weight or the suffi-
ciency of the evidence may err toward reversal based on weight so that the
defendant may be retried. The Court's decision in Tibbs, therefore, has the ef-
fect of limiting the exception recognized in Burks. Although the majority in
Tibbs contrasts reversals based on weight from those based on insufficiency in
attempting to distinguish Burks, the Court, in fact, allows Burks to be under-
mined. The Tibbs decision will inevitably lead to retrial of defendants who
under Burks should,be set free.
B. The Weaknesses In The Supreme Court's Double Jeopardy
Analysis In Tibbs
The Supreme Court in Tibbs concluded that allowing the retrial of a
defendant who obtained a reversal of his conviction based on the weight of the
evidence did not violate the double jeopardy clause. 230
 The Court's justifica-
228 For a good discussion of the Jackson standard and the issues it raises by extending
the reasonable doubt standard to appellate court review of the sufficiency of the evidence, see
Comment, The Jackson o. Virginia Standard For Sufficiency of the Evidence, 65 Iowa L. REV. 799
(1980).
229 Id. at 807-10. ("[W]hen an appeals court determines whether the factfinder has acted
reasonably, it must inevitably make some determination as to the weight of the evidence, even
while giving the trial court very broad discretion. This necessarily results in some substitution of
the appellate court's judgment for that of the trial court." Id. at 807.).
2" Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2220 (1982).
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tions for this conclusion were not persuasive, however, either in terms of the
Court's earlier decisions or in light of established double jeopardy policy. This
section of the casenote will be divided into two parts. The first demonstrates
that the distinction drawn by the Court in Tibbs fails to follow the reasoning of
other recent Supreme Court double jeopardy decisions. The second part shows
that the Court in Tibbs lost sight of the primary protection sought to be pro-
vided by the double jeopardy clause, namely, the prevention of multiple trials
where governmental oppression might result. 231
1. The Relationship of the Tibbs Distinction Between the Weight and Suf-
ficiency of the Evidence to the Reasoning of Recent Supreme Court Double
Jeopardy Decisions
The Tibbs opinion fails to follow the double jeopardy analysis the Supreme
Court announced in Burks and Scott. In those opinions, the Court pointed out
that the important distinction for double jeopardy analysis was that between
judicial determinations based on trial error and those based on a failure of
proof. 232 In Burks, the Court stressed that its earlier failure to distinguish be-
tween reversals based on evidentiary grounds and those on procedural grounds
had helped to create much of the confusion existing in double jeopardy law. 233
In holding that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial after a reversal
for trial error, the Court reasoned society would pay too high a price, in the
form of defendants released who might otherwise be convicted, if retrial were
barred following reversal of a conviction for trial error. 234 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that a reversal for trial error implies nothing with respect to the
guilt or . innocence of the defendant. 235 The Court suggested that when a
defendant is convicted through a defect in the judicial process, both the accused
and society have a strong interest in retrial.'" In contrast, the Court said that
when a conviction is overturned because of a "failure of proof" at trial,
society's interest in the enforcement of criminal laws is vindicated because the
.
prosecution has been given "one full and fair opportunity to offer whatever
proof it could assemble." 237
Based on the language of the Court in Burks, the double jeopardy bar
should also be raised following a reversal based on weight. When the Florida
Supreme Court reversed Tibbs' conviction stating that the great weight of the
evidence indicated that Tibbs should not have been convicted, the reversal im-
7" See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
purpose of the Clause ... is to protect the accused against the agony and risks attendant upon
undergoing more than one criminal trial for any single offense. A retrial ... enhances the risk
that an innocent defendant may be convicted.").
237 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at
96-99. See Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 214, at 939.
233 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 14-15.
234 Id. at 15 (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
255 Id.
236 Id.
13 ' Id. at 16.
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plied that the prosecution had not produced evidence adequate to support a
conviction. As such, the reversal clearly implied something with respect to
Tibb's guilt or innocence, 238 even if it did not mean the evidence was legally in-
sufficient. When a court reverses a conviction based on the weight of the
evidence the prosecution has had the same full, error-free opportunity to con-
vict that it is allowed when a conviction is reversed based on insufficiency."9
Tibbs' conviction was not reversed because of a procedural defect in the
judicial process that deprived him of the opportunity for a fair trial or the State
of its interest in the enforcement of criminal laws, but instead because of a
"failure of proof., Y240
The Supreme Court's decision in Scott would also seem to indicate that re-
trial following a reversal based on weight should be prohibited by the double
jeopardy clause. In Scott, the Court held that when a defendant avoids convic-
tion without even having the issue of guilt submitted to the trier of fact, the
double jeopardy clause poses no bar to further prosecution."' The Court
stressed that in such a case the defendant is not asserting that the Government
failed to make out its case against him. 242 Instead, the defendant argues that
because of a "legal claim" the prosecution's case must fail even though the
prosecution might otherwise have convinced the trier of fact to convict."' In
Tibbs, the defendant not only had the issue of his guilt submitted to the trier of
fact, but he also obtained a reversal from the reviewing court because the con-
viction was against the great weight of the evidence.'" A reversal based on
weight, by definition, indicates that the Government failed to make out its case
adequately to support a conviction."' As Justice White, writing for the dissent
in Tibbs, stated, the fact that the State's proof was held inadequate under
Florida law, rather than on federal grounds, is irrelevant. 246 In both situations,
if the Government had produced the required evidence, the conviction would
have stood. Tibbs did not appeal his conviction on the basis of a "legal claim,"
but rather on the grounds that the totality of evidence produced at trial was not
sufficient to support a guilty verdict."' Based on the reasoning of the Court in
238 The Supreme Court of Florida stated in reversing Tibbs' conviction that there was a
"very real possibility that Tibbs had nothing to do with these crimes. . . ." Tibbs v. State, 337
So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976).
239 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2221-22 (White, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting). See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43 (1981).
241
	 States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978).
"2 Id.
249
244 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976).
248
 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2223 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
247
 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1976).
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both Burks and Scott, therefore, a defendant should not be retried if he is able to
obtain a reversal of his conviction based on the weight of the evidence.
2. The Validity of Tibbs In Light of Fundamental Double Jeopardy Policy
Although the Tibbs Court did not refer to its earlier decision in Scott, it
sought to distinguish its opinion in Burks on two grounds. First, the Court
acknowledged that judgments of acquittal are given special weight in a double
jeopardy analysis. 248 The Court reasoned that a reversal based on insufficien-
cy, unlike one based on weight, was the functional equivalent of an acquittal.'"
The Court stressed that the reversal in Tibbs, which was based on the weight of
the evidence, did not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict."°
According to the Court, a reversal on the weight of the evidence should not
therefore be accorded the same treatment as an acquitta1. 2 " Second, recogniz-
ing that the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of giv-
ing the prosecution a second opportunity to supply evidence, the Tibbs Court
maintained that this policy does not have the same force when a reviewing
judge simply "disagrees" with a jury's verdict.'" A study of the basic policies
that underlie the double jeopardy clause is necessary to determine the validity
of these distinctions drawn by the Court.
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court attaches special weight to judgments
of acquittal. In Kepner v. United States, 253 the Court adopted earlier dicta in Ball
that stated the government should not be permitted to appeal verdicts of ac-
quitta1. 254 Moreover, decisions subsequent to Kepner have firmly established
that the double jeopardy clause forbids retrial of a defendant who has been ac-
quitted of the crime alleged. 255 The classic policy consideration for barring
retrial in such cases was articulated in Green v. United States. 256 In Green, the
Court recognized two important reasons for barring retrial after an
acquittal."' First, the State with all its resources should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict, thereby subjecting the defendant to the agony
248
 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982).
245 Id.
250
25) Id.
252 Id. at 2218-19.
253 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
254
 Id. at 129.
2" See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1980); Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
"6 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
257 Id. at 187-88. See Note, The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Defendant's Double .feopardy
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and risks associated with undergoing a second criminal trial for the same of-
fense.'" Retrial subjects the defendant to embarrassment, 259 expense 26° and
ordea1, 2" as well as compelling the accused to live in a continuing state of anx-
iety and insecurity. 262 Second, allowing retrial after an acquittal enhances the
risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted. 263 The Government would
be allowed the opportunity to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's
guilt and to strengthen any weaknesses in its initial attempt at convicting the
defendant. 264 If the Government were allowed such repeated attempts at con-
viction following an acquittal, a defendant's interest in obtaining a final judg-
ment would never be served—an accused would never be conclusively "inno-
Interests In the 1977 Term, 48 U. CIN. L. REV, 517, 536-37 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Double
Jeopardy Interests].
2!8
 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957),
259 See Crist v. BretZ, 437 U.S. 28, 51-52 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
evidence of the alleged criminal conduct ... becomes a matter of public record.").
26° See Scott v. United States, 437 U.S. 82, 105 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A
retrial increases the financial and emotional burden that any criminal trial represents for the ac-
cused. . ."). Aside from the financial costs directly associated with trial, lost wages and
decreased prospects for future employment also result.
261
	 United States v. Jam, 400 U.S. 400, 479 (1970) ("Society's awareness of the
heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the criminal defendant is manifested in
its willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital
interest in enforcement of criminal laws.").
262 See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978) ("[Retrial] increases the
financial and emotional burden on the accused, [and] prolongs the period in which he is
stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing. . . ."). See generally Note, Criminal Pro-
cedure—Double Jeopardy—Government May Appeal From Successful Defense Motion For Midtrial Dismissal
Unrelated To Guilt Or Innocence—United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), 9 SETON HALL L. REV.
579, 595 n.125 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Criminal Procedure]. ("The heavy strain, embar-
rassment and expense of repeated criminal trials subject the defendant to burdens not unlike
criminal punishment itself, even where he is not incarcerated between trials.").
263 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). For a good discussion of this
danger of unjust conviction, see Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 262, at 601 ("To allow
reprosecution after the government has viewed the defendant's evidence would unfairly
strengthen the already powerful prosecutorial arsenal. Having gained penetrating insight into
defense tactics and substantive defenses, the government could strengthen its case upon retrial,
The prosecution would be given a second chance, thus enhancing the possibility of the unjust
conviction of the innocent.").
264 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 106 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Burks,
the Court stated that a central purpose of the double jeopardy protection was preventing the State
from making repeated attempts at conviction. United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
In considering the danger of unjust conviction at a second prosecution, it is important to
recognize that the prosecution is not limited to the evidence introduced in the initial proceeding.
United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233, 243 (1957) ("It is undeniable, of course, that
upon appellate reversal of a conviction the Government is not limited at a new trial' to the
evidence presented at the first, but is free to strengthen its case in any way it can by the introduc-
tion of new evidence.").
May 1983]	 CASENOTES	 801
cent."'" This policy forbidding retrial following an acquittal has been held so
vital to the double jeopardy protection that defendants may not be retried even
if their acquittals were clearly erroneous. 266
The key to understanding the double jeopardy analysis relevant to Tibbs is
realizing why retrial is barred following an acquittal. Because even clearly er-
roneous acquittals cannot be appealed, 267 the rule obviously does not rest on a
conclusion that the defendant was innocent and therefore should not be
retried. 268 Instead, retrial is prohibited because an acquittal, or an appellate
court reversal of a conviction based on the insufficiency of the evidence, consti-
tutes a decision to the effect that the Government has failed to prove its case. 269
To permit retrial following an acquittal would present all of the dangers the
double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent. 270 Allowing a second prosecu-
tion would create the grave risk that the Government, with its superior
resources, would convict an innocent defendant."' If retrial were allowed
266 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982). ("Repeated prosecutorial sallies
would unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental
perseverance."). See Note, Government Appeals of "Dismissals" In Criminal Cases, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
1822, 1838 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Government Appeals] ("The rule against a second trial
after acquittal bars a prosecution from subjecting the defendant to repeated trials until a fact-
finder will agree to convict."); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 278 ("Without a rule of
finality no procession of juries could effectively acquit a defendant, but a single jury could con-
vict. The prosecutor could keep trying until he found an accommodating panel,"); Findlater,
supra note 52, at 725 ("[N]o jury could ever finally acquit, and sooner or later, through attrition,
luck or otherwise, the prosecutor could in all probability obtain a conviction.").
266 Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
'" See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) ("The public interest in the finality
of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though
'the acquittal was based on an eggregiously erroneous foundation.' " Id., at 503 (quoting Fong
Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. at 143).
268 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 108 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). A number
of commentators have noted that the prohibition of retrial following an acquittal could in no way
rest on the notion that the defendant was absolutely "innocent." See, e.g., Comment, Burks v.
United States: Redrawing the Lines in Double Jeopardy, 1979 DET. C. L. REV. 193, 201 n.66 ("The
policy of the [double jeopardy] clause is to prevent multiple prosecutions for the same offense,
without regard to the question of guilt."); Note, United States v. Scott: Government Appeals of Midtrial
Dismissals Granted on Defendant's Motion, 43 ALB. L. REV. 595, 614 (1979) ("[T]he principle pro-
hibiting retrial after acquittal is not based on the defendant's factual innocence, otherwise the
government would be able to appeal a clearly erroneous acquittal"); Note, Double Jeopardy In-
terests, supra note 257, at 545 ("The requirement that a defendant must be found factually inno-
cent has no relevance to double jeopardy interests.").
2" See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. at 106, 107 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Findlater, supra
note 52, at 726-27.
27`
	
Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982) ("This prohibition [of retrial
following an acquittal or an appellate reversal based on insufficiency] prevents the state from
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following an acquittal the danger of convicting an innocent defendant would be
significant because the prosecution would have great incentive to remedy any
defects in its case. 272 A central objective of the double jeopardy protection is.
that the prosecution should not be given such a second opportunity to supply
evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. 273 Retrial after a
reversal based on evidentiary shortcomings would allow the prosecution the op-
portunity to strengthen its case and enable it to benefit from the first proceed-
ing. 274 The government would be given an opportunity to re-examine witness-
es, seek new evidence and otherwise strengthen any weaknesses in its first
presentation. 2 " The resulting delay might also create the potential for inaccu-
rate reproduction of evidence that originally had been favorable to the defend-
ant. 276 Consequently, the double jeopardy clause forbids retrial following an
acquittal or an appellate reversal based on the sufficiency of the evidence be-
cause "the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed repeat-
ed attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense." 277
honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction.
Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of convic-
tion through sheer governmental perseverance."). See also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91.
2r2 Findlater, supra note 52, where the commentator said the risk of unjust conviction
if retrial were allowed following an acquittal would be intolerable because "revanchist" pros-
ecutors would be determined to win their cases the second time around. A defendant faced with
retrial following an acquittal would not only be drained by the effects of his first trial, he would
also have to face a prosecutor who had the benefit of a trial run and was determined not to lose
again. Id. at 725-27.
273
	 v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 11 (1978). See also Note, Government Appeals, supra
note 265, at 1840 ("[By allowing retrial] the prosecution would be given another opportunity to
convict the defendant, and thus its burden of persuasion would be effectively reduced. . . .").
274 See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. at 11.
276
	 States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 105-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
276 See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n.14 (1978), for an example of how
testimony originally favorable to the defendant may change at retrial:
"[A] key prosecution witness, the last person to see the appellant and the deceased
together, who began by testifying that they had acted that evening like newlyweds
on a honeymoon, without an un-friendly spoken word, ended up by saying for the
first time in four trials that the words between them had been 'firm,' and possibly
harsh and 'cross.' "
Id. (quoting Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Leventhal, J., con-
curring)).
Commentators have also recognized the potential evidentiary changes that can occur as
a result of a second trial. See, e.g., Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—Fifth Amendment—Double
Jeopardy—The Double Jeopardy Clause Bars Appellate Review Following A Judgment of Acquittal Entered
Under federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)—U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 US. 564 (1977),
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1061-62 (1978) ("The opportunity opened to the government to pre-
sent a better case on appeal, after having heard the defendant's case and eliminated the
weaknesses in its own case, is a potent weapon."); Note, Double Jeopardy Interests, supra note 257,
at 537 ("Additional evidence against the accused may be introduced at the second trial. Facts
resolved in the defendant's favor at the first trial will have to be resolved again. . . . The defend-
ant may be financially and emotionally less able to defend himself at the second trial. The result
may be that the burden of proof the government bears is more easily met.").
"7 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
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Although the double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial when a conviction is
reversed based on the insufficiency of the evidence, defendants who are able to
secure reversals based on trial error must face further prosecution. In order to
understand the different treatment accorded the two types of reversals, the
double jeopardy considerations forbidding retrial following an appellate re-
versal based on the insufficiency of the evidence should be contrasted with the
situation when a conviction is reversed based on trial error. First, when a con-
viction is reversed because of trial error, the state maintains its valid interest in
the enforcement of its criminal laws.'" Because the prosecution has not been
given a complete opportunity to•convict the defendant when there is a fun-
damental flaw in the judicial process, and the defendant retains his right to be
given a fair trial, it is simply "fairer" to both the state and the accused to allow
retria1. 27 Second, a reversal for trial . error does not constitute a decision to the
effect that the government has failed to prove its case. 2"0 Allowing retrial after a
conviction is reversed based on trial error does not present the same danger of
convicting an innocent defendant that would exist in a second prosecution
following an acquittal because such a ruling implies nothing with respect to the
defendant's guilt or innocence."' When a conviction is reversed based on trial
error, the prosecution has no reason to go out and strengthen its case, but in-
stead is justified in believing that if it presents the same case again on retrial,
this time omitting the trial error, the defendant would once again be
convicted."' Permitting retrial following a reversal based on the state's failure
of proof, therefore, unlike a second prosecution after a reversal based on trial
error, greatly increases the possibility of convicting an innocent defendant."'
The double jeopardy policies which have led the Supreme Court to hold
that the double jeopardy clause forbids retrial following an acquittal or a re-
versal based on the insufficiency of the evidence also support the prohibition of
retrial following a reversal based on weight. 284 As the dissent in Tibbs pointed
278 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
279
	
e.g., Carusona, Double Jeopardy: The Prevention of Multiple Prosecutions, 54 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 549, 550 (1977) ("The fairness rationale means that it is simply fairer to both the
defendant and the government to allow retrial [when a conviction is reversed based on trial error]
because the accused's right to a fair trial corresponds to society's interest in punishing the
guilty."); Note, Double Jeopardy, supra note 214, at 942 ("This cost of allowing retrial of a
defendant] may not be especially high in relation to the price society would have to pay if guilty
defendants were able to avoid punishment by virtue of undeserved legal defenses.").
288
	 v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
281 Id. See Findlater, supra note 52, at 729-30.
262 Findlater, supra note 52, at 730 ("Further, the prosecution need not feel he certainly
must do a better job on retrial. . . The prosecutor ... has no special incentive to seek out a
more favorable judge or jury, uncover additional evidence, polish the testimony of his witnesses,
or otherwise strengthen his case, thereby enhancing the risk that an innocent defendant will be
convicted.").
283 See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). See also Atlas, Double Jeopardy and
Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1974); Note, Government Appeals,
supra note 273, at 1838-39 (1974).
264 See Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2223 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
804	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 24:771
out, the state has the same interests in overcoming its evidentiary shortcomings
following a reversal based on weight as it does following a reversal based on
evidentiary insufficiency. 2" When a reviewing court, such as the Florida
Supreme Court in Tibb's case, determines that a conviction is against the
weight of the evidence, certainly this creates an incentive for the prosecution to
go out and "hone its trial strategies" and perfect its evidence. 2" Knowing that
the evidence it presented at Tibbs' first trial was not adequate, on retrial the
State could improve its case by correcting some of the weaknesses the state
supreme court identified in the State's original presentation of the evidence. 287
Moreover, because the prosecution has already been given a full and fair op-
portunity to convict the defendant when a conviction is reversed on weight, the
only purpose in allowing a second trial would be to enable the State to
strengthen its case. 2 " Recognizing that if it produced the same evidence on re-
trial a guilty verdict would again be against the weight of the evidence,'" it is
doubtful that the State would be content to present the same case at a second
prosecution.'"
The United States Supreme Court in Tibbs determined that retrial was
permissible following a reversal based on weight, thereby according it the same
treatment given to reversals based on trial error, even though the Court
recognized the possibility that allowing retrial following a reversal based on
weight would permit the prosecution to strengthen its case. 29 ' The Court noted
that new evidence and an advanced understanding of the defendant's case
might strengthen the prosecution's presentation. 292
 The Court mentioned,
however, that possibly the defendant's case would be the one strengthened. 2"
2" Id. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 2218. See Findlater, supra note 52, at 732.
287 See supra note 26 and accompanying text for a list of these weaknesses.
288
 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2222 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
289 See id. at 2221-22 (White, J., dissenting).
298
 The majority in Tibbs stated that following a reversal on weight the prosecution is not
necessarily required to introduce new evidence. Id. at 2219 n.18. The Court reasoned that
because a reviewing court is often acting "in the interests of justice" when it reverses based on
weight, it would be most reluctant to say that a conviction was against the weight of the evidence
if two juries rendered guilty verdicts. Id. The obvious difficulty with this reasoning is that it
assumes the prosecution would be willing to take its chances that a second jury would convict the
defendant after a reviewing court determined its first presentation to be inadequate. When the
state was preparing for retrial it would not be concerned with what a second reviewing court
would decide, but instead with what decision the new jury will reach. The problem with the ma-
jority's contention is that it ignores the issue relevant to the double jeopardy protection. The im-
portant question is not whether the prosecution must introduce new evidence in a second pros-
ecution in order to satisfy a reviewing court, but instead whether it will do so to attempt to con-
vince the new factfinder. See Findlater, supra note 52, at 735.
291 Id. at 2219 n.19. The Court noted that the "second chance" it was giving to defend-
ants also meant the prosecution would be afforded a second try. Id.
292 Id.
2" Id. The Court went on to explain that because the State had already secured a con-
viction based on sufficient evidence, it had everything to lose and little to gain on retrial. Id. This
reasoning would seem to go against allowing retrial, however, because the State does have
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The Court further justified allowing retrial following a reversal based on
weight by stating that such a reversal does not mean that acquittal was the only
proper verdict, and characterizing the appellate court in such a situation as a
"thirteenth juror" that merely disagrees with the jury's verdict. 294 The Court
reasoned that this "difference of opinion" no more signifies an acquittal than a
deadlocked jury does.'"
The Court's analysis in this area is faulty for two reasons. First, as was in-
dicated above, acquittals are not given special weight in double jeopardy
analysis because they prove unquestioned innocence. 296 Rather, judgments of
acquittal bar retrial because of the danger that innocent defendants possibly
would be convicted in a second prosecution."' As Justice White, writing for
the dissent in Tibbs, explained, because this danger exists whenever a review-
ing court makes a ruling based on the State's failure of proof, the determina-
tion should not have to constitute an "acquittal" in order to prevent retrial. 299
A reversal on weight should, therefore, properly be held to bar retrial not
because such a ruling means the defendant was not guilty of the alleged of-
fense. Instead, retrial should be prohibited following a reversal based on the
weight of the evidence because further prosecution after such a ruling increases
the likelihood that an innocent defendant will be convicted. 299 Unlike a reversal
"everything to lose" on retrial. The prosecution would have great incentive to go out and obtain
additional evidence, re-advise witnesses, etc., because it would not want to see all of its earlier ef-
forts wasted. It should also be noted that the adversarial capabilities of the two litigants are not
equal and as a result the State's advantage on retrial is.even greater than it would appear at first
glance. See, e.g., Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149, 1152 (1960) ("Both doctrinally and practically, criminal procedure ... gives
overwhelming advantage to the prosecution."); Casenote, Double Jeopardy—Finality of Judgment of
Acquittal In Criminal Prosecutions, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 518, 523 (1962) ("it is generally recog-
nized that pitted against the limited resources of the defendant are the comparatively unlimited
resources of the prosecution. . . .").
294 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2218-19.
295 Id. at 2219.
296 See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
297 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). The Tibbs Court's heavy
reliance on the fact that reversal based on weight does not mean that acquittal was the only prop-
er verdict becomes even more suspect when it is recognized that the Court's definition of an "ac-
quittal" has not remained constant. For example, in United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267
(1970), the Court defined an acquittal as a "legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at
trial relating to the general issues of the case." Id. at 290 n.19, while in Scott the Court developed
the definition of an acquittal as "the ruling of a judge ... which actually represents a resolution
[in the defendant's favor] . , . of some or all of the factual elements charged." 437 U.S. at 97.
The four Justices who dissented in Scott argued that the majority "indefensibly adopt[ed] an
overly restrictive definition of 'acquittal.' " Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because a re-
versal based on the weight of the evidence could arguably come under the definition of acquittal
adopted in Sisson, one way for the Court correctly to resolve Tibbs would have been to return to
that standard. The other way, of course, would be to realize that a court's determination should
not have to constitute an "acquittal" for the double jeopardy bar to the raised.
298 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
299 Other commentators have recognized that the double jeopardy considerations that
prohibit retrial following an acquittal also support the imposition of a bar to reprosecution in
other situations where factual determinations are made by a court. See, e.g., Note, Government Ap-
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baied on trial error, a conviction that is overturned based on the weight of the
evidence constitutes a decision that the government has failed to prove its case.
The State should not be allowed to use the first proceeding as a "trial run. "S 00
Indeed, it is even more important to forbid retrial following a reversal based on
the weight of the evidence than it is after a reversal based on insufficient
evidence. When a reviewing court reverses a conviction based on weight the
State has theoretically produced evidence sufficient to support a conviction and
thus all the prosecution is required to do on retrial is to provide enough addi-
tional evidence to allow a court also to hold that the weight of the evidence sup-
ports conviction. Although the State might sometimes be inclined to dismiss an
indictment if its evidence is determined to be insufficient,301 the prosecution
almost certainly will retry a defendant if it need only bolster its case enough to
have the weight of the evidence support conviction.
The second problem with the majority opinion in Tibbs is that the Court's
characterization of an appellate reversal based on weight as a mere "difference
of opinion" with the trier of fact is misleading. Reviewing courts do not reverse
convictions based on the weight of the evidence just because they would have
decided the case differently,'" but instead because the evidence preponderates
heavily against the guilty verdict: 3 °3 Such a ruling certainly leads to the dangers
that initially led the Supreme CoUrt to prohibit retrial following an acquittal;
the State would be allowed a second opportunity to present evidence it failed to
produce in the initial proceeding and consequently the chances of convicting an
innocent defendant would be greatly increased. As a result, further prosecution
following a reversal of a conviction based on the weight of the evidence should
not be allowed. The important distinction in determining the applicability of
peals, supra note 265, at 1839 ("[A]cquittal should be defined according to whether the [court's]
disposition was based on a factual resolution in the defendant's favor. "); Note, Criminal Procedure,
supra note 261, at 597 ("What is relevant to the issue of appealability is the effect of reprosecution
upon the underlying double jeopardy interests, not the label that may be attached. . . .").
'°° See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U:S.
497, 508 n.24 (1978); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
n' See Findlater, supra note 52, at 732 ("[W]hen the defendant's conviction is reversed
for insufficiency of the evidence, the prosecution knows that he has failed to present enough
evidence to convict and will usually seek to retry the defendant only if he thinks he can remedy
the deficiency.").
"2
 For an excellent commentary that concludes these same dangers of unjust conviction
should also bar retrial following a deadlocked jury, see Findlater, supra note 52. The author states
that following a hung jury, the prosecution knows its first presentation has not led to a conviction
and the chances that it will attempt to improve its case are great. Id. at 735. See also Note, Double
Jeopardy Interests, supra note 257, at 541 n.141.
Whatever the merits of prohibiting retrial after a dismissal is declared because a jury is
unable to reach a verdict, certainly the indication of factual innocence, and correspondingly the
danger of convicting an innocent defendant if retrial is allowed, is greater when a reviewing court
determines that a conviction is against the weight of the evidence.
303 See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d § 553,
246-48 (1982). "The motion is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised
with caution, and the power [to reverse a conviction based on the weight of the evidence] should
be involved only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the ver-
dict." Id.
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the double jeopardy clause, as the dissent in Tibbs pointed out, is whether the
reversal was based on trial error or on evidentiary shortcomings in the prosecu-
tion's case.'" Whenever a conviction is reversed because of a failure of proof,
the danger of convicting an innocent defendant exists, and therefore the double
jeopardy clause should bar further proceedings.
In summary, the Supreme Court in Tibbs v. Florida. determined that retrial
following an appellate reversal of a conviction based on the weight of the
evidence was not barred by the double jeopardy clause. The Court, in so do-
ing, accorded reversals based on weight the same treatment given to reversals
based on trial error, despite the fact that none of the justifications for allowing
retrial after a conviction is overturned for trial error exist when a reversal is
based on weight. First, the state's interest in the enforcement of its criminal
laws would not be infringed if retrial were prohibited following a reversal based
on weight. Unlike the situation when a conviction is set aside because of a
defect in the initial proceeding, the state has already received a full, error-free
opportunity to convict when a reversal is based on weight. The second justifica-
tion for allowing retrial after a reversal due to a procedural error at trial is that
such a decision implies nothing as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Clear-
ly, a reversal based on weight does imply something with respect to the defend-
ant's guilt or innocence: it constitutes a decision that the great preponderance
of the evidence does not support a guilty verdict. As such, the decision by the
Supreme Court in Tibbs to allow retrial following a reversal based on weight
greatly increases the chances of convicting an innocent defendant. Because this
danger is the principal reason for the Court's holding that retrial following an
acquittal or an appellate reversal based on the insufficiency of the evidence is
barred by the double jeopardy clause, the Tibbs decision, in effect, imposes an
additional limitation on a defendant's ability to invoke the double jeopardy
protection. Even if a conviction is reversed on evidentiary grounds and retrial
would allow the prosecution a second opportunity to supply evidence it failed to
muster in the first proceeding, the defendant will be able to raise the double
jeopardy protection only if he is able to secure an "acquittal."
CONCLUSION
Prior to Tibbs, the double jeopardy consequences of two classes of ap-
pellate reversals of convictions were clear. Retrial was allowed where a convic-
tion was reversed because of trial error, but the double jeopardy clause pro-
hibited further prosecution where a defendant was able to get a conviction
overturned based on the insufficiency of the evidence. In Tibbs, the United
States Supreme Court held that retrial of a criminal defendant is not prohibited
by the double jeopardy clause when an appellate court reverses a conviction
based on the weight of the evidence. As a result of Tibbs, some defendants who
904 Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2223 (1982) (White, J., dissenting),
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succeed in getting their convictions set aside by a reviewing court based on
evidentiary shortcomings will have to face retrial.
The Tibbs decision has restricted defendants' protections from multiple
trials for three reasons. First, reviewing courts will encounter problems in try-
ing to distinguish between reversals based on weight and those based on insuf-
ficiency. Because the distinction established in Tibbs is a difficult one to make,
some defendants who under Burks should be set free will have to face further
prosecution. Second, the Supreme Court in Tibbs failed to follow the reasoning
stressed in recent double jeopardy decisions. The Court allowed retrial follow-
ing a reversal based on the weight of the evidence even though Burks and Scott
explained that it was important to distinguish between reversals based on
evidentiary grounds and those based on trial error. Those decisions stated that
retrial should be allowed when a defect in the initial proceeding causes a con-
viction to be set aside, but that a second prosecution should be forbidden where
the earlier proceeding suggests the factual innocence of the defendant. Third,
and most important, the Supreme Court in Tibbs lost sight of the basic policies
that underlie the double jeopardy protection. The Court held that retrial was
permitted following a reversal based on weight even though the rationale that
prohibits a second trial following an acquittal or an appellate reversal of a con-
viction based on the insufficiency of the evidence applies with equal force to a
reversal based on weight. In both situations retrial presents the danger of con-
victing an innocent defendant. In holding that retrial is allowed after a reversal
based on weight, the Tibbs Court gave the double jeopardy clause an unwar-
rantedly narrow application and as a result significantly limited a criminal de-
fendant's protection from being placed twice in jeopardy.
WILLIAM P. GELNAW, JR.
